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Phenomenology and Anthropology in Foucault’s Introduction to 
Binswanger’s ‘Dream and Existence’: a Mirror Image to The Order 
of Things ? 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper, I examine the relation between phenomenology and anthropology by 
placing Foucault’s first published piece, Introduction to Binswanger’s ‘Dream and Existence’ (1954, 
henceforth IB) in dialectical tension with The Order of Things (1966, henceforth OT). I argue that 
the early work, which so far hasn’t received much critical attention, is of particular interest 
because while OT is notoriously critical of anthropological confusions in general, and of ‘Man’ as 
an empirico-transcendental double in particular, IB views ‘existential anthropology’ as a unique 
opportunity to establish a new and fruitful relation between transcendental forms and empirical 
contents. This is because IB focuses on a specific object, ‘Menschsein’ (the ‘being of man’), which 
is neither the transcendental subject nor an empirical being (a member of the class Homo sapiens). 
Thus for the young Foucault existential anthropology occupies a fertile methodological middle 
ground between transcendental approaches (exemplified in IB by Heideggerian phenomenology) 
and empirical forms of analysis (exemplified by Freudian psycho-analysis). I first interpret 
anthropology in the light of phenomenology and defend the view that Menschsein is neither a 
transcendental structure nor a concrete particular, but as the instantiation of the first in the 
second. I argue that for anthropology to yield the full theoretical benefits Foucault claims for it, 
the particular cases of Menschsein examined in existential analysis have to be regarded as 
exemplary. I then read phenomenology back in the light of anthropology and examine how, for 
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Foucault, the analysis of Menschsein in dreams benefits fundamental ontology by affording us a 
clearer view of some of the main existentiale than the focus on everyday waking experience in 
Being and Time. Finally, I turn to the limits and difficulties of this early position and my reading 
of it, and to their consequences for Foucault’s later view.  
 
KEY WORDS: Foucault; Binswanger; phenomenology; anthropology; archaeology; ‘Menschsein’; 
‘Man’. 
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 In the Order of Things (henceforth OT), Foucault is notoriously critical both of 
phenomenology and anthropology. He understands the first as an inheritor of the Kantian enquiry 
into the transcendental conditions of possibility of experience which was subsequently corrupted 
by the second.1 In a (very compact and somewhat tough) nutshell, he identifies the source of such 
corruption by means of a new term of art: ‘Man’.2 A ‘strange empirico-transcendental double’, 
Man is both given within experience (as a living, working and speaking being) and outside of 
experience as its condition of possibility (since experience is only possible through the mediation 
of the body, social forms and norms, and language). The consequence for Foucault is that it 
becomes impossible to distinguish appropriately between empirical contents and their 
transcendental conditions of possibility; worse, empirical contents acquire what he calls a ‘quasi-
transcendental’ function. Thus ‘each of the positive forms in which man can learn that he is finite 
is only given to him on the background of his own finitude’ (OT: 325, my translation). 
Correlatively, anthropology is not characterised narrowly, as a discipline or a set of contents, but 
in relation to ‘Man’: it is the form typical of contemporary thought. Anthropology is ‘a mixed level 
reflection (...) which characterises modern philosophy: (...) it is an empirico-critical doubling 
whereby one tries to make the man of nature, of exchange or of discourse stand as the foundation 
of his own finitude’ (OT: 352, my translation). Because of this anthropological doubling (or ‘Fold’, 
as Foucault calls it) of the empirical on the transcendental, phenomenology is bound to fail: it 
                                                     
1 As I have argued elsewhere, Foucault identifies this anthropological corruption within Kant’s own oeuvre. 
Thus according to chapter 7 of OT, Kant’s major discovery in the First Critique was the possibility to answer 
Humean scepticism about human knowledge by distinguishing between experience and its transcendental 
conditions of possibility. The movement from the post hoc to the a priori, whereby (for example) causality 
was shown to be a pure category of understanding rather than a regularity observable a posteriori in nature, 
allowed the recourse to such transcendental conditions to warrant universality and necessity for empirical 
knowledge. By contrast, for Foucault this clear separation between empirical contents and their 
transcendental foundations was blurred by the binding of the three critical questions in the Jascher Logik to 
a fourth, ‘was ist der Mensch?’: ‘les trois questions critiques (que puis-je savoir? Que dois-je faire ? Que 
m’est-il permis d’espérer ? se trouvent alors rapportées à une quatrième, et mises en quelque sorte ‘à son 
compte’ : was ist der Mensch ?’ (OT : 352). 
2 To distinguish 'Man' as a term of art from the everyday use of the word 'man', I shall capitalise the first. 
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cannot justify its modal claims to universality or necessity, which makes fulfilling the Kantian 
project impossible.  
 Thus in OT anthropology is the bane of phenomenology. Yet twelve years earlier, in his long 
Introduction to Binswanger’s ‘Dream and Existence’ (henceforth IB), the younger Foucault 
conceived of a particular brand of anthropology, existential analysis,3 in rather different terms: he 
saw it as a unique opportunity to establish a new and fruitful relation between transcendental 
forms and empirical contents – an exciting avenue for thought rather than the shape of the 
problem plaguing Modernity. According to the early Foucault, the warrant for these claims is the 
idea that ‘existential anthropology’, as he calls it,4 has uncovered a specific object, namely 
‘Menschsein’ – ‘being human’, or ‘the being of man’ (IB: 31). Understanding this object 
appropriately will allow anthropology as a method to occupy a fertile middle ground between 
transcendental approaches (exemplified in IB by Heideggerian phenomenology) and empirical 
forms of analysis (exemplified by Freudian psycho-analysis). But this raises a number of questions: 
how should we understand the stark contrast between, on the one hand, the perspective of OT, 
which sees the question ‘was ist der Mensch?’ as the start of the end for the transcendental/ 
phenomenological project and, on the other hand, the early view for which the focus on 
Menschsein5 is a promising development for the very same project? Further, how do we 
understand Menschsein? In particular, why not talk of ‘man’, as anthropologists do, or of ‘Dasein’, 
as Heidegger does? How does existential anthropology differ from fundamental ontology? And 
                                                     
3 Binswanger himself saw existential psychoanalysis as a form of anthropology: see for example the title of 
perhaps his most famous study, ‘The Case of Ellen West: an Anthropological Clinical Study’. See also his 
1942 book, Grundformen und Erkenntnis menschlichen Daseins, in which he details the ways in which 
existential analysis involves an anthropological outlook.  
4 I am well aware that neither Binswanger nor Foucault have a monopoly on the notion of ‘existential 
anthropology’ – it is often referred to the work of the New Zealand anthropologist Michael D. Jackson, who 
sought to combine the methods of traditional anthropology with those of phenomenology. But in this paper 
I shall follow Binswanger’s and Foucault’s own lead and take ‘existential anthropology’ to be synonymous 
with ‘existential analysis’. In the context of IB Foucault himself often uses ‘anthropology’ and ‘existential 
anthropology’ interchangeably, and I shall do so as well occasionally (in relation to the same context of 
course).  
5 To avoid italics fatigue I have only italicised ‘Menschsein’ or ‘Dasein’ when this was done in the original 
text by Foucault or Heidegger themselves.   
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how will bringing the early view into focus affect (if at all) our understanding of the later 
Foucault’s position?  
 A preliminary word on method: in seeking answers to these questions, I will not enter the 
game of trying to identify biographical reasons, nor attempt to give external reasons meant to 
justify (or denounce) the changes in Foucault’s assessment of the potential of anthropology.6 I shall 
instead read the two texts immanently, and place them in dialectic tension with each other: I shall 
read IB in the light of OT, and OT, in the light of IB. More specifically, I shall take OT’s focus on 
‘Man’ as an a contrario background to bring into view the more positive relation between the 
empirical and the transcendental that IB seeks to establish; conversely, I shall re-contextualise the 
perspective of OT in the light of the anthropological project as described in IB. I shall thus read 
the two sources as mirror images of each other at least in one respect: while the later text sees the 
relation between the empirical and the transcendental in modernity as a vicious circle, the early 
text can be read as trying to establish a virtuous form of circularity between the two.7  
 In the first part of this paper, I shall interpret anthropology in the light of phenomenology 
and attend to the key notion of ‘Menschsein’. I shall suggest that Foucault’s claims make the most 
sense if Menschsein is understood, neither as a transcendental structure nor as a concrete 
particular, but as the instantiation of the first in the second. I shall further defend the view that 
for anthropology to yield the full theoretical benefits Foucault claims for it, the particular cases of 
Menschsein examined in existential analysis have to be regarded as exemplary. I shall then read 
phenomenology back in the light of anthropology and examine how, for Foucault, the analysis of 
                                                     
6 One may object that the meaning of the word ‘anthropology’ is too different in IB and OT for a dialogue 
between the two texts to be even possible. Yet recall that in OT ‘anthropology’ does not name a discipline 
but a particular, circular way of relating the empirical and the transcendental which is at work (for 
Foucault) in contemporary thought. And as I shall develop, the possibility of establishing a specific relation 
between the empirical and the transcendental is precisely what is picked out by (existential) anthropology 
in IB. The congruence between the two perspectives is thus much stronger than it may appear at first sight.  
7 I am well aware of the hermeneutic dangers of such an enterprise – in particular the risk of reading each 
text into the other. But such awareness can by itself contribute to ward off the exegetical danger, and 
hopefully the heuristic pay-off will prove worth the risk.   
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Menschsein in dreams benefits fundamental ontology by affording us a clearer view of some of the 
main existentiale than the focus on everyday waking experience in Being and Time. Finally, I shall 
turn to the limits and difficulties of this early position, and their consequences for Foucault’s later 
view.  
 
Interpreting anthropology in the light of phenomenology: Was ist Menschsein?  
 
 Existential anthropology is not introduced in IB as an empirical science but as a 
methodological middle ground between ‘philosophy’ on the one hand – in particular Heideggerian 
phenomenology - and ‘all concrete, objective and experimental knowledge’ on the other (IB: 31). 
Foucault defines ‘Menschsein’ as the specific object of anthropology thus conceived: 
‘[anthropology is] a form of analysis, finally, whose principle and method are determined from the 
start solely by the absolute privilege of the object: man, or rather the being of man, Menschsein 
(IB: 31, Foucault’s italics). Note the correction: the appropriate object of anthropology is not ‘man’ 
(as a member of the species ‘homo sapiens’) but the ‘being of man’. Menschsein is not a natural 
entity whose behaviour could be causally explained through the laws of nature (and their 
biological or psychological variants): throughout the text, Foucault reads Freud as a foil presenting 
precisely this kind of naturalistic interpretation of psychic life and opposes anthropology to ‘any 
type of psychological positivism claiming to exhaust the significant content of man by the 
reductive concept of homo natura’ (IB: 31).8 By contrast, to understand Menschsein adequately 
one needs to draw explicitly (as Binswanger himself did) on the resources of fundamental 
                                                     
8 Whether it is fair to understand Freud naturalistically is a much debated question which I shall leave aside 
here as my internalist perspective does not require an assessment of the validity of Foucault’s views on 
Freud. Note that Foucault’s reading is in line with Binswanger’s: according to the latter, Freud saw ‘the 
deepest essence of man [as] instinctual impulse, whose elemental nature is the same in all men and which 
directs him to the satisfaction of certain primal needs. (...) The most important and most obscure element of 
psychological research is the organism’s instinct’ (‘Freud’s Conception of Man in the Light of Anthropology’, 
in Selected Papers, 156).  
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ontology: ‘the working dimensions of anthropology can therefore be circumscribed: it relocates 
anthropology within the context of an ontological reflection whose major theme is being-in-the-
world, existence (Existenz), Dasein’ (IB: 31, translation modified). Such ontological context is 
crucial because it allows the anthropologist to consider her object in a non-reductive manner, 
using ‘existence’ as a starting point. In its technical sense, existence is defined by Heidegger as ‘the 
kind of being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does 
comport itself somehow’ (BT: 33). Existence is not human life empirically understood, let alone an 
empirical fact about an entity (as when one talks about ‘the existence of the moon’) but the self-
interpreting activity which is both presupposed by and expressed in all forms of Dasein’s 
comportment: to exist, in Heidegger’s sense, is to pre-reflectively, and practically, understand 
oneself as being in the world. The ontological structures of such self-understanding are what 
Heidegger calls the existentiale. Correlatively, the appropriate method to explore such structures is 
the analytic of existence: thus ‘the question about that structure [the ontological structure of 
existence] aims at the analysis of what constitutes existence. The context of such structures we call 
“existentiality”’ (BT: 33).  
 So the reason why anthropology is ‘a form of analysis which is fundamental in relation to all 
concrete, objective and experimental knowledge’ (IB: 31, my italics) is precisely that rather than 
starting from man as an empirical being, it takes Menschsein as its point of departure and 
understands the latter from the perspective of  fundamental ontology. Conversely, ‘an 
anthropology of this sort can validate itself only by showing how an analysis of human being can 
be articulated upon an analytic of existence. As a problematic of foundations, it must define in the 
latter the conditions of possibility of the former’ (IB: 31-32). The analytic of existence is the 
‘condition of possibility’ of existential anthropology in the sense that it provides the latter with the 
theoretical foundation and the methodological tools required to capture its object appropriately. 
But what is the difference, then, between anthropology and fundamental ontology? The same 
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difference, I suggest, as between ‘Menschsein’ and ‘Dasein’ as terms of art. This would be easier to 
characterise if ‘Dasein’ itself was an unproblematic concept: but this is not the case. As pointed out 
by Wayne Martin,9 commentators usually take at least one of the two following options, 
sometimes both, and most often in an implicit manner: some, like Hubert Dreyfus or Taylor 
Carman, understand ‘Dasein’ to refer primarily to the class comprising all human beings; others, 
like John Haugeland, deny that this is the primary extension of the concept and start from its 
intension (its Fregean sense): they take ‘Dasein’ to mean a self-interpretative way of life,10 which 
could in principle include a number of non-human entities as ‘cases of Dasein’.11 Regardless of this 
important difference, however, both sides would definitely agree that Heidegger himself does not 
explicitly identify ‘Dasein’ with ‘being human’. Yet according to Foucault that is precisely the 
meaning of ‘Menschsein’.  
 So if Menschsein is neither ‘homo natura’  nor Dasein, then what is it? Foucault proposes the 
following definition: ‘let us say provisionally that being human (Menschsein) is nothing but the 
actual and concrete content which ontology analyses as the transcendental structures of Dasein 
(IB: 32, translation modified). As we shall see, this is an ambiguous definition, and the manner of 
this ambiguity both anticipates on and seems to corroborate the difficulties later deemed 
characteristic of anthropology in OT. But for now let us focus on a more favourable exegetical 
avenue. As with Dasein, one could go with an extensional or an intensional definition for 
Menschsein. The first would be unlikely to help, though, because the extension of the class ‘being 
human’ is precisely what is under debate, and so far we have only had negative definitions (as ‘not 
a human being’, and ‘not Dasein’): and since (in Spinoza’s famous words) omnis determinatio est 
negatio, and for each determination there is an indefinite number of such negations, that is not 
                                                     
9 ‘The Semantics of ‘Dasein’ and the Modality of Being and Time’, in The Cambridge Companion to Being 
and Time, CUP: 2013, p. 100-128.  
10 See Haugeland, Dasein Disclosed, p. 160.  
11 See for example ‘Heidegger on Being a Person’, Nous, volume 16, March 1982, in particular p. 23 sq. 
Haugeland regards such cases of Dasein as ‘units of accountability’.  
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particularly helpful. If we go down the intensional route, then one possibility would be to take the 
notion of a ‘concrete content’ in the above quote literally and to understand Menschsein as the set 
of empirical elements active in our psychic life (such as the drives and the various psychological 
processes associated with them). However, making this interpretative move would be tantamount 
to closing the gap repeatedly highlighted by IB between existential anthropology and naturalistic 
approaches.  
 A little further in the text Foucault states that the object of anthropology is ‘characterised, not 
by a line of division [between the empirical and the transcendental] but by an encounter with 
concrete existence’ (IB: 32, my italics). As with the previous quote, one could construe such 
‘encounter’ uncharitably, as an early site of the empirico-transcendental confusions that OT will 
denounce. But a more interesting option, I submit, and one which is licensed by Foucault’s 
constant emphasis in IB on anthropology as a methodological middle ground, is to understand this 
‘encounter’ differently: as an instantiation of the transcendental in the empirical.12 On this 
interpretative line, to say that Menschsein is the ‘actual and concrete content which ontology 
analyses as the transcendental structures of Dasein’ is to say that Menschsein is the instantiation, 
in a concrete particular, of the transcendental structures identified by Heidegger in relation to 
Dasein. Whereas Being and Time analyses these structures at the ontological level, as existentiale, 
anthropology focuses on a concrete individual (this or that dreamer) understood as the empirical 
locus of instantiation of the ontological structures. From this perspective, the phenomenological 
insight into these structures works as a kind of fore-conception (in the technical sense Heidegger 
gives the word ‘Vorgriff’ in Being and Time)13: it gives the existential anthropologist an advance 
                                                     
12 I am well aware that this is a double edged suggestion: the notion of ‘instantiation’ is not used by Foucault 
himself and it comes with a number of difficulties attached, some of which I shall touch upon later in this 
paper. However having recourse to this notion is the best way I can see to make sense of IB in a 
hermeneutically charitable manner.   
13 (namely a preliminary understanding of the object that guides the inquiry and will (or not) be confirmed 
by the object itself). See BT, §32: 189.  
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grasp of the salient articulations of the experience she seeks to understand, and allows her to 
illuminate such experience in a more appropriate manner.  
 Viewing Menschsein as the instantiation, in a concrete particular, of the existentiale of 
fundamental ontology puts us in a better position to understand the methodological specificity of 
existential anthropology: it makes sense of the claim that the latter is in ‘basic opposition to any 
science of human facts of the order of positive knowledge, experimental analysis and naturalistic 
reflection’ without yet being identified with ‘some a priori form of philosophical reflection’ (IB: 
32). It also explains why existential anthropology must not be seen as an ‘“application’ of the 
concepts and methods of the philosophy of existence to the “data’ of clinical experience’ (IB: 32). 
This would be mistaken because it would assume that anthropology and the empirical sciences 
have the same object (‘the “data” of clinical experience’ – note the inserted quotation marks) but 
use different methods. By contrast, the instantiation reading emphasises the specificity of 
Menschsein as the appropriate object for anthropology. It also allows us to make sense of the 
introduction of a twin category, namely that of the ‘human fact’. Foucault defines the latter as 
follows: ‘the theme of the inquiry is the human ‘fact’, if one understands by “fact” not some 
objective sector of a natural universe, but the real content of an experience which is living itself 
and is experiencing itself’ (IB: 32). This distinction between objective and subjective meanings 
echoes the distinction made in Being and Time between ‘factuality’ (Faktualität) and ‘facticity’ 
(Fakticität). As it is well known, the first refers to the features whereby an empirical entity may be 
objectively defined (thus in the case of a human being, being male or female, being a certain 
height, a certain age, etc.). By contrast, the second is specific to Dasein and refers to its ability to 
make sense of these features (reflectively or pre-reflectively) in relation to its own self-
understanding: thus ‘male’ may be interpreted as ‘masculine’, ‘macho’, ‘butch’ and the like, 30 as 
‘young’ or ‘old’ (30 would be young for a tenured academic but old for a professional athlete). For 
Heidegger, factuality is best analysed by the empirical sciences, and facticity, by fundamental 
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ontology. And as with Menschsein in relation to both ‘man’ and ‘Dasein’, so with the idea of a 
‘human fact’ in relation to factuality and facticity: it differs from the first in that it does not refer 
to a set of characteristics that could be defined from a third person standpoint (in Foucault’s terms: 
‘some objective sector of a natural universe’). It differs from the second (facticity) in that it is not 
an ontological structure of existence, but this structure instantiated in the self- understanding of a 
concrete particular. As the ‘real content of an experience which is living and experiencing itself’, it 
is the first-personal, self-interpretative understanding of an actual individual in whom facticity, as 
an existential structure, is instantiated. In the context of ‘Dream and Existence’, such 
understanding is expressed in the dreams recounted by patients.  
 Let me pause at this point to highlight what I see as the main benefit of this reading: placed in 
the prospective context of OT, it allows us to understand IB as the one text in which Foucault 
considers the possibility of a relation between the empirical and the transcendental which goes 
beyond the Kantian critical project while avoiding the pitfalls of the analytic of finitude: for 
Menschsein is neither a case of confusion, nor of vicious circularity. Why not? According to OT, 
the main problem with phenomenology is the impossibility of establishing a stable relation 
between the empirical of the transcendental. For Foucault, this is because from Kant’s 
Anthropology onwards, phenomenological enquiry (in particular in its Husserlian form) became 
focused on ‘Man’ as a structure. From this anthropological perspective, understanding how the 
two sides of the empirico-transcendental double are related was taken to require a genetic account 
through which one would be able to explain, or at least describe, the process whereby the 
transcendental can appear within the empirical. In other words, the aim became to account for the 
genesis of the transcendental within ‘Man’ as an empirico-transcendental double. This genesis can 
be understood as a developmental story explaining how a child, for example, may grow into the 
capacity for occupying a transcendental standpoint, or as a methodological story (such as the 
introduction of the transcendental and eidetic reductions in Husserl) about how such a standpoint 
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can emerge out of an adult’s natural attitude. Either way, the point for Foucault is that such 
genetic accounts invariably generate paradoxes of retrospection, the form of which is given by 
constant oscillations between two equally problematic temporal terms: ‘as soon as’ and ‘already’. 
On the one hand, because a transcendental framework is required to make sense of the very 
experience through which the transcendental perspective itself takes hold, the transcendental can 
only appear within the empirical as pre-existing itself in what Derrida called (in relation to 
Husserl) a kind of ‘primitivity’ – a ‘before’ that is unthinkable because it refers to a time ‘before’ 
temporality itself takes hold as a framework of intelligibility. In Foucault’s words, ‘the relation of 
the given and of the a priori takes a reverse structure in the Anthropology to that revealed in the 
Critique. The a priori in the order of knowledge, becomes in the order of concrete existence an 
originary which is not chronologically first but which, as soon as it appears (...) reveals itself as 
already there (Commentary: 60, Foucault’s italics, my underlining). On the other hand, from this 
genetic perspective the transcendental can only appears to a pre-existing empirical being (the 
empirical side of ‘man’ as the empirico-transcendental double). As a result, the very contents that 
are given in the transcendental framework also appear as pre-existing it empirically as an endlessly 
receding origin: ‘[man], as soon as he thinks, merely unveils himself to his own eyes in the form of 
a being who is already, in a necessarily subjacent density, in an irreducible anteriority, a living 
being, an instrument of production, a vehicle for words that exists before him’ (OT: 313, my 
italics).  
 By contrast, on the instantiation reading the perspective of IB is not one of genesis: there is no 
paradoxical tension between equally impossible temporal terms. Existential anthropology does not 
proceed diachronically but synchronically. It starts from the view that transcendental structures 
are instantiated in a particular individual and uses this starting point as a hermeneutic tool to 
generate results that a positivistic approach (such as Freudian psychology as Foucault characterises 
it) cannot yield, namely: understanding specific dreams as expressive of specific forms of 
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intentionality. Thus the whole point of introducing the notion of Menschsein as an ‘encounter’ 
between transcendental structures and ‘concrete existence’ is precisely both to maintain the 
empirico-transcendental distinction and to put it to productive use in order to understand a 
concrete particular appropriately. Consequently, existential anthropology never takes instantiation 
to be a temporally extended process whereby an entity would become a case of Menschsein. 
Further, existential anthropology remains agnostic about whether one needs a genetic perspective 
at all to account for the relation between the transcendental and the empirical in human 
experience: it just starts from Menschsein as its specific object. Thus the significant benefit of the 
instantiation reading is that it allows existential anthropology to neatly side-steps the main issue 
that plagues modernity according to OT, namely the problem of the genesis of the transcendental 
in the empirical and the paradoxes of retrospection that follow from it.  
 This, of course, leaves open the question of whether the notion of instantiation can do the 
work it is supposed to do, a difficulty to which I shall return in conclusion. For now, let me pursue 
this line of interpretation a little further. For Foucault does not just suggest that Menschsein is the 
instantiation of transcendental structures in a concrete particular. He also makes the following 
claim: ‘anthropology may thus call itself a ‘science of facts’ by developing in rigorous fashion the 
existential content of being-in-the-world. To reject such an inquiry at first glance because it is 
neither philosophy nor psychology, (...) because it neither looks like positive knowledge nor 
provides the content of a priori cognition, is to ignore the basic meaning of the project (IB: 32, my 
italics). Yet the instantiation reading of Menschsein examined so far does not by itself warrant the 
idea that anthropology ‘develops in rigorous fashion the existential content of being in the world’; 
it only licenses the second part of the quote, namely the thought that this kind of inquiry is 
‘neither positive knowledge nor provides the content of a priori cognition’ but must be located at 
its own level. But what, then, is the ‘basic meaning of the project’? In my view, the ‘rigorous 
development claim in the first part of the quote makes the most sense if taken to mean that there 
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is something that fundamental ontology itself could learn in return from anthropological 
developments: this is why the development is about ‘existential content’, not about empirical 
conclusions pertaining, say, to a particular individual’s psychological features. Foucault gives us a 
further hint in the following passage: ‘[existential anthropology] is a matter (...) of bringing to 
light, by returning to the concrete individual, the place where the forms and conditions of 
existence articulate’ (IB: 32, my italics). As we shall see, the possibility of such ‘bringing to light’ 
rests on a specific hermeneutic hypothesis, namely that existential anthropology has a significant 
advantage over fundamental ontology: whereas everyday life tends to obscure the presence and 
the role of ontological structures (a recurrent theme in Division One of Being and Time), the 
dream world allows some of the major existentiale, in particular projection, thrownness and 
falling, to come to the fore with greater experiential intensity. Given that these, taken together, 
form the tripartite structure of care (BT: 284) and are thus definitive of Dasein, it would indeed be 
a ‘rigorous development about existential content’ for anthropology to thus refine the insights 
afforded by fundamental ontology.   
 So the development claim points to the thought that the analysis of Menschsein can shed 
further light on the ontological lineaments of being-in-the-world. If this correct, then on the early 
Foucault’s interpretation the relation between the transcendental and the empirical is not a one 
way ticket: we can learn something about the existentiale themselves by analysing specific cases of 
Menschsein as their instantiation in a concrete particular. This, however, is only possible if the 
relevant concrete particular is taken to be exemplary of all other cases of Menschsein: the claim 
that ontological structures are instantiated in a concrete particular must be supplemented by the 
further claim that this particular exemplifies Menschsein for the enquirer.14 For unless this was 
                                                     
14 Pettit usefully distinguishes between instantiation and exemplification in the following way: ‘instantiation 
is a two place relationship between a set of examples and a rule and it certainly has the feature of being a 
one-many relationship: one finite set of examples instantiates many rules. (...) Exemplification is a three 
place relationship, not a two place one. It involves not just a set of examples and a rule but also a person for 
whom the examples are supposed to exemplify the rule. (Pettit, 1990: 10). 
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true, no general conclusions about ontological structures could be legitimately inferred from the 
examination of a specific particular they are instantiated in. By contrast, if that concrete particular 
is taken to be exemplary of Menschsein, then anything we learn from its consideration will also 
apply to all such instantiations, since what is true of an exemplar is by definition true of all of its 
kind.15 Thus if a particular animal is taken as an exemplar of a mammal and is ineliminably warm-
blooded, then we can legitimately infer that all mammals are warm blooded. Analogically, if a 
particular feature is disclosed about, say, understanding or thrownness through the analysis of an 
exemplary case of Menschsein, then this will apply to all other instantiations of the existentiale in 
question. Thus the exemplarity claim is an implicit requirement for existential anthropology to 
offer a ‘rigorous development of the existential content’ of fundamental ontology: the instantiation 
reading also has to be an exemplarist reading, and this how I shall refer to it from now on.  
 If both the instantiation and the exemplification claims are correct, then IB can be viewed in 
a particularly interesting light: it appears, not as a precursor of the analytic of finitude but as an 
alternative to it. By regarding Menschsein as the instantiation, in a concrete particular, of the 
transcendental structures analysed by fundamental ontology, and further, by regarding the 
particulars analysed by existential anthropology as exemplary of such instantiation, one can both 
shed better light on the relevant particulars and gain a more detailed understanding of the 
existentiale at play. This may sound too much like having one’s anthropological cake and eating it. 
But before I turn to the difficulties afferent to this position, let me attend to some of its 
hermeneutic benefits.  
 
Re-interpreting phenomenology in the light of existential anthropology: the disclosive potential of 
the dream world.  
 
                                                     
15 For an exemplarist reading of ‘Dasein’ itself, see Martin (2013) on what he calls ‘exemplar semantics’ (in 
particular p. 117 sq.).  
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 The thought that existential anthropology can shed further light on ontological structures is 
emphasised  in the following passage: ‘the theme of this 1930 essay (...) is less dream and existence 
than existence as it appears to itself and can be deciphered in the dream. (...) [its aim is] to arrive at 
a comprehension of the existential structures’ (IB: 33, second italics mine). Foucault is well aware 
of the paradox which consists in analysing existence, as involvement with the world, by starting 
from the somewhat disconnected and disjointed perspective of dreams. Yet his view is that 
precisely because of this relative disconnection from the everyday, such perspective allows us to 
deepen our comprehension of three key existentiale: (a) transcendence as freedom, (b) thrownness 
as materiality, (c) falling as a ‘plunge’ into inauthenticity. I shall look briefly at each in turn. 
 Foucault states that ‘the dream discloses paradoxically the movement of freedom toward the 
world’ (IB: 51). In the Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Heidegger himself had identified 
freedom and transcendence toward the world: ‘Dasein’s transcendence and freedom are identical! 
Freedom provides itself with intrinsic possibility: a being is, as free, necessarily in itself 
transcending’ (MFL: 184, Heidegger’s italics). Such freedom is by definition projective, so long as 
projection is distinguished from planning as the reflective sequencing of possibilities harnessed to 
a particular end. By contrast (and very sketchily), projection is the practical deployment of 
Dasein’s possibilities through its everyday comportment: thus Dasein projects itself as a writer not 
by making plans for its publishing career but by understanding writing as an agential possibility 
for itself. As many have pointed out, such understanding does not need to be reflective: it can take 
the form, for example, of exercising the ability to write, or of developing that ability through 
immersing oneself in reading, attending a course, etc. In the everyday world, though, Dasein’s 
sense of the possible is significantly constrained by a large number of factors: natural laws (in 
particular the laws of physics and of biology), economic and political constraints, cultural and 
social norms, etc. Against this restrictive background, and given the pressures of conformism, it is 
all too easy for Dasein to understand its agential possibilities very narrowly, and ultimately to lose 
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sight of its own role in the deployment of such possibilities, and thus of its own freedom. In fact 
such forgetfulness, Heidegger suggests in Division One of Being in Time, is the most common 
situation.  
 By contrast, the kind of projection involved in dreaming is free from many of these 
restrictions, and in particular from the constraints of logic, of time and of natural laws: this is 
evidenced by the numerous non sequiturs and logical impossibilities experienced in dreams, by 
the possibility of ‘rewinding’ various events of our lives when we dream, and by such phenomena 
as dreams of flight, of falling upwards and the like. In the dream world our sense of the possible is 
much wider, and freer (in the sense of free play) than in real life: just as in aesthetic experience 
the play of the faculties is not constrained by concepts, in the same way in dreams our sense of the 
possibilities available to us is not constrained by the laws of the waking world. Correlatively, our 
ability to project comes to the fore in proportion to the degree in which it is liberated from 
everyday constraints. Thus in its most radical, unconstrained form, the dream is ‘the originative 
movement of freedom, the birth of the world in the very movement of existence’ (IB: 51). Rather 
than finding itself constrained by a pre-existing world, the dreamer is able to open up both her 
possibilities and the world in which these make sense in a single originary projection. At its 
utmost degree, the freedom of the dreamer appears as a frictionless spinning in which her agential 
possibilities, rather than having to find their place in a pre-existing context, deploy that very 
context in the very movement of projection. Such frictionless spinning can be experienced as 
euphoric or as terrifying, or even both at the same time: either way, the analysis of dreams allows 
for the full disclosure of freedom as projective transcendence in a way which the analysis of the 
everyday does not.  
 Yet the world of the dream, although it is free from a number of the constraints operative in 
the real world, is not totally unconstrained. In Being and Time, thrownness is the name Heidegger 
uses to refer to the constraints that Dasein finds as already bearing on itself. Such constraints are 
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usually understood, in line with the above considerations, as a set of natural, economic or social 
determinants which restrict Dasein’s projective abilities and bind the horizon of its agential 
possibilities. Yet for Foucault the analysis of dreams allows thrownness to come to the fore in 
another, perhaps more primal form: ‘in its anthropological significance the history of the dream 
teaches us that it both reveals the world in its transcendence and modulates the world in its 
substance, playing on its material character’ (IB: 49, my italics). Here Foucault’s analyses borrow 
heavily from Bachelard’s notion of ‘material imagination’ to suggest that the particular ways in 
which the dreamer’s projective abilities are constrained in the dream world depend on the 
dreamer’s affinity with a particular element (such as water for Baudelaire or Poe, for example). 
The theme of materiality is also very strongly linked to that of corporeality, another major figure 
of thrownness. But for Foucault, the utmost of thrownness is revealed by dreams in the form of 
radically unintelligible constraints. Thus ‘the dream is deployed (...) in a world which secretes its 
opaque contents and the forms of a necessity which cannot be deciphered’ (IB: 54). A fictitious 
example of such a world, and of how oppressive unintelligible constraints can be, is given by 
Kafka’s nightmarish description of K’s struggles against the ‘official world’ in the Castle. By 
contrast, in real life we (thankfully) rarely find ourselves faced with situations which radically 
resist all our attempts to understand them; and if we do, then such situations appear particularly 
intolerable – thus one of the reasons why Blanchot, another author dear to Foucault, deems the 
Holocaust so chilling (in The Writing of the Disaster) is the impossibility of making sense of it 
within our standard framework of intelligibility. So the ‘opaque contents’ of the dream world 
represent a radical form of thrownness because the combination of apodicticity and 
undecipherability they manifest renders the dreamer utterly powerless: from revealing the 
extreme of freedom, the dream world now reveals the extreme of thrownness in the form of 
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radical unintelligibility experienced as necessity, and as the deprivation of all meaningful agential 
possibilities.16  
 Finally, existential anthropology brings ‘falling’ into view by disclosing the possibility of 
authentic and inauthentic ethical comportment in dreams, thus completing the series of 
anthropological insights into the tripartite structure of care. Here too, the logic is one of 
magnification and radicalisation. In particular, whereas Being and Time identifies three ethical 
modes of being for Dasein (authenticity, inauthenticity and undifferentiatedness), in IB Foucault 
only acknowledges the first two: ‘the dream experience cannot be isolated from its ethical content. 
Not because it may uncover secret inclinations, inadmissible desires, (...) but because it restores 
the movement of freedom in its authentic meaning, showing how it establishes itself or alienates 
itself, how it constitutes itself as radical responsibility in the world, or how it forgets itself and 
abandons itself to its plunge into causality’ (IB: 52). Authenticity and inauthenticity seem 
understood here in a Sartrian rather than a Heideggerian manner, as (respectively) the heroic 
shouldering of full responsibility for oneself and for the world or, conversely, the total 
relinquishing of responsibility that comes from understanding oneself as causally determined, and 
thus on the mode of present-at-hand entities. At any rate, the important point is that dreams seem 
to perform a similar role to anxiety in Being and Time: they have an ontologically disclosive 
power and force the individual to come back to herself: ‘the dream is free genesis, self-
accomplishment, emergence of what is most individual in the individual’ (IB: 54).  
 
The limits of the exemplarist reading: methodological difficulties in IB and consequences for 
Foucault’s own project.  
   
                                                     
16 Interestingly, identifying unintelligibility with the most radical form of thrownness is a move that has 
recently been made in the context of the literature on Heidegger by Katherine Withy (2011), who 
understands the ultimate of thrownness as the fact that the horizon of intelligibility for our practices is itself 
beyond our ability to make sense of things.  
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 Thus IB is of particular interest because – on the exemplary reading presented above - it is the 
only text in which Foucault sees and develops the possibility of a productive partnership between 
phenomenology and anthropology. The upshot of such partnership is a new way of thinking of the 
relation between the empirical and the transcendental: neither fully separated, as in the First 
Critique, nor superposed in the ambiguous figure of ‘Man’ as in Kant’s Anthropology and the 
subsequent figures of thought identified by OT. By contrast, Menschsein appears as the specific, 
and appropriate, object of existential anthropology. I have suggested above (a) that the best way to 
understand Menschsein is to regard it as the instantiation, in a concrete particular, of the 
structures analysed by fundamental ontology (the existentiale); and (b), that to warrant Foucault’s 
claims about existential anthropology being a ‘rigorous development of the existential content’ of 
fundamental ontology, the relevant concrete particulars must be regarded as exemplary for the 
enquirer of all cases of Menschsein. If these conditions are fulfilled, then a positive circularity is 
established between the empirical and the transcendental in anthropological analysis: starting 
from Menschsein allows for a non-reductive analysis of human experience. But conversely, 
existential anthropology can contribute to phenomenological analysis: the anthropological 
examination of dreams reveal and magnify the major articulations of being in the world with a 
clarity that surpasses that of the everyday.  
 Yet like most seemingly perfect solutions, this may be too rosy a picture – Foucault’s later 
indictment of anthropology certainly suggests that it is. Indeed, there are some significant 
methodological issues in the early work. That Foucault himself knew this is indicated by a number 
of promissory remarks such as the following: ‘to be sure, this encounter [with concrete existence], 
and no less surely, the status that is finally to be assigned to the ontological conditions, pose 
problems. But we leave that issue for another time’ (IB: 33, my italics). Or again, ‘in another work 
we shall try to situate existential analysis within the development of contemporary reflection on 
man, and try to show, by observing the inflection of phenomenology towards anthropology, what 
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foundations have been proposed for concrete reflection on man’ (IB: 31). To my knowledge, there 
was never time for that ‘other time’, or that ‘other work’.17 We are left with IB, where Foucault 
himself defines the shape of the problem more precisely as follows:  
 
[IB: 32] [Binswanger] outflanks the problem of ontology and anthropology by going straight 
to concrete existence, to its development and its historical content. Thence, by way of an 
analysis of the structures of existence (...) he moves continually back and forth between the 
anthropological forms and the ontological conditions of existence. He continually crosses a 
dividing line that seems so difficult to draw, or rather he sees it ceaselessly crossed by a 
concrete existence in which the real limit of Menschsein is manifested.  
 
 This passage shows that Foucault was aware of the locus of the difficulty – as ever, that 
‘dividing line that seems so difficult to draw’, namely the articulation of the empirical and the 
transcendental, and more specifically the status of Menschsein and its relation to ‘concrete 
existence’. So what are the ‘real limits’ of Menschsein? The exemplarist reading I developed above 
was my best attempt to make sense of the concept as a specific and viable relation between the 
empirical and the transcendental. But while it is (in my view) supported by the text, such reading 
is not the only possible one. In the very passage that introduces it, Menschsein can also be read 
uncharitably: not as the instantiation of ontological structures in a concrete particular but as a 
locus of empirico-transcendental confusions. Recall Foucault’s words: ‘let us say provisionally that 
being human (Menschsein) is nothing but the actual and concrete content which ontology 
analyses as the transcendental structures of Dasein (IB: 32, translation modified, my underlining). 
Yet the theme of an ‘actual and concrete content’ being analysed as a transcendental structure can 
be seen as exhibiting precisely the kind of methodological confusion denounced by the analytic of 
                                                     
17 (neither Maladie mentale et personnalité nor Maladie mentale et psychologie fit that particular bill).  
22 
 
 
finitude: namely, as a case of empirical contents acquiring a ‘quasi-transcendental’ function. From 
this perspective, Menschsein would then anticipate exactly on the structure of ‘lived experience’ 
as criticised in chapter 9 of OT: ‘lived experience is at the same time the space where all empirical 
contents are given to experience; it is also the originary form which makes them possible and 
points to their primary belonging. (...) The analysis of lived experience (...) does nothing but fulfil 
with greater care the hasty demands that were laid out when one decided to give, in man, the 
empirical transcendental value [faire valoir l’empirique pour le transcendental]’ (OT: 332, my 
translation). On this interpretative line, Menschsein would be both given in experience as an 
‘actual and concrete content’ on the one hand, and the very framework through which experience 
itself is mediated (the ‘transcendental structures of Dasein’) on the other. Then Menschsein in IB 
would simply be an early illustration of ‘Man’ as the structure of the analytic of finitude whereby 
the ‘pre-critical analysis of what man is in his essence becomes the analytic of anything that can 
be given in general to man’s experience’ (OT: 352).  
 This is the most unfavourable interpretation of IB, and one I have sought to avoid. But the 
exemplarity reading I have proposed instead is not exempt of difficulties. The first concerns the 
exemplary status of Menschsein. As we have seen, unless the particular instance of Menschsein 
under examination can be regarded by the enquirer as exemplary of all cases of instantiation of the 
existentiale, Foucault’s claim that anthropology is a ‘rigorous development of the existential 
content’ of fundamental ontology cannot be warranted. But the problem with this exemplary 
reading is that it is vulnerable to the set of difficulties that beset the idea of rule following in 
general: in particular, it raises the thorny issue of the identification of the conditions under which 
something may or not count as an exemplar of a particular rule. It goes well beyond the remit of 
this paper to consider these difficulties in detail. In a nutshell, the general form of the problem is 
that since any finite set of examples can instantiate indefinitely many rules, it may be impossible 
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to establish with any degree of certainty whether a particular set exemplifies a determinate rule.18 
In the specific case that has occupied us so far, this means that there may be no way of telling 
whether any particular case of Menschsein is a genuine exemplification of the instantiation of the 
existentiale of fundamental ontology. In that case, it would be impossible to draw any general 
conclusions, from the analysis of a particular case of Menschsein, about the nature of the 
existentiale involved. This may not be an unsolvable problem, although no decisive solution has 
been offered yet.19 But unless or until an argument from instantiation to exemplification is offered, 
existential anthropology will not be in a position to deliver ontologically robust results: the ‘back 
and forth’ between phenomenology and anthropology may turn out to be, after all, a one way 
ticket.  
 Admittedly, even so Menschsein may still be coherently and legitimately understood as the 
instantiation of transcendental structures in a concrete particular. But because the relation 
between instantiation and exemplification is not examined, let alone grounded, the possibility of a 
productive partnership between phenomenology and anthropology remains formal: it is 
impossible to draw any decisive ontological conclusions from the analysis of dreams. In that case – 
short of an argument which neither Foucault nor Binswanger will present – the main gain from IB 
remains the warding off of reductive naturalism through the introduction of Menschsein as the 
specific object of anthropology and the appeal to phenomenological concepts and methods to 
illuminate it. The naturalistically-minded would likely deny that this is a gain at all. However, the 
fact that the early Foucault sees this as a positive is important in the wider context of his later 
rejection of Marxism as overly focused on causal explanations. It brings further evidence (if it was 
needed) of Foucault’s lifelong concern for avoiding reductive empiricism and for defining a 
                                                     
18 P. Pettit formulates the problem in the following way: ‘the fact is that any finite set of examples, 
mathematical or otherwise, can be extrapolated in an infinite number of ways; equivalently, any finite set of 
examples instantiates an infinite number of rules. It appears then that I cannot be put in touch with a 
particular rule just on the basis of finite examples’. (Pettit, 1990: 7). See also Pettit: Rules, Reasons and 
Norms, OUP, 2002. 
19 For a detailed discussion of the problem and of possible solutions, see Watts (2012). 
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specific level of analysis for his own work. Yet even this anti-naturalist gain is not fully secure: for 
further difficulties attach to the notion of instantiation itself. The problem is this: how do we 
know that a concrete particular is a case of Menschsein at all? In other words, how do we account 
for the instantiation relation itself? There are at least two possibilities to answer these questions: 
one is to say that we need a third term linking Menschsein and the concrete particular in question 
to account for such instantiation. But if that is the case then yet a further term will be needed to 
account for the relation between the newly introduced third term and the instantiation relation, 
and this ad infinitum. This version of the Third Man argument (Parmenides, 132 a-b) is sometimes 
referred to as ‘Bradley’s regress’.20 There are a number of theoretical moves available: but none so 
far has been considered decisive. The other possibility is to deny that we need any intermediaries 
and to regard the relation of instantiation as a primitive. Thus G. Bergmann (1960) likens it to 
‘metaphysical glue’ and P. Strawson (1959) understands instantiation a ‘non-relational tie’.21 Yet 
here too the suggestion is not decisive – in particular, one may complain that it only solves the 
problem by stipulation.   
 As with exemplification, the difficulties afferent to the notion of instantiation do not per se 
invalidate the exemplarist reading I have presented above. The latter remains a viable alternative 
to the thought that IB is simply a prefiguration of the analytic of finitude. But it is a formal 
alternative, and this doubly so (because further arguments are needed regarding both 
exemplification and instantiation). Whether the securing of this formal possibility is a Pyrrhic 
victory or a genuine gain is hard to say, especially since Foucault himself did not develop this early 
line of investigation any further. Still, there is another respect in which IB is important. If 
considered archaeologically, so to speak, it is the first stratum of Foucault’s intellectual journey, 
                                                     
20 For a formulation of the problem, see Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay, 
TheClassics.us, 2013. There is a useful discussion of the Third Man argument in Vlastos, G., ‘The Third Man 
Argument in the Parmenides’, Philosophical Review 63 (1954), 319-349. See also Sellars, X; ‘Vlastos and the 
Third Man’, Philosophical Review 64 (1955), 405-437.  
21 Respectively: Logic and Reality, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, in particular p. 45-63, and 
Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1959.  
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his first published work. From this perspective, it is very significant that its methodological focus 
should be on the relation between the empirical and the transcendental. Even though by 1966 
Foucault has given up on anthropology and sees it as part of the problem rather than as a solution, 
he is still concerned with rethinking the relation between the empirical and the transcendental. 
Thus IB is a prefiguration of OT in yet another, positive sense: whether it anticipates on the 
doomed analytic of finitude or provides the shape of an alternative to it, this early text sets 
Foucault’s theoretical agenda for at least the next ten years. It is the crucible in which Foucault 
started to see the shape of the problem that would govern his own archaeological work: how to 
avoid bald naturalism and conceive of a relation between the empirical and the transcendental 
that goes beyond the First Critique, but without falling into anthropological confusions. Whether 
Foucault’s own reinterpretation of the empirico-transcendental relation was a success is, as we 
know, still a debated question. But set  against the context of IB, the historical a priori appears as 
the desubjectivised inheritor of Menschsein, and archaeology itself – even though it was designed 
to wake us up from our ‘anthropological sleep’ (OT: 351) – as the methodological successor to 
existential anthropology.  
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